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The Tips Are for the Taking: The Supreme Court
Limits Third Party Liability in Dirks v. Securities
and Exchange Commission
In recent years, a growing furor has developed concerning when the use
of material inside information constitutes a violation of Rule 10b-5. SEC
enforcement efforts have dramatically increased in an attempt to crack
down on use of inside information by "tippers" and "tippees" in violation
of Rule 10b-5. In Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the
United States Supreme Court erected an additional obstacle to the SEC's
further enforcement efforts. By judicial fiat, the Court added an element to
a Rule 10b-5 violation by engrafting a new personal motivation require-
ment on the insider's fiduciary duty to his corporation. Under this new
rule, neither a "tipper" nor a "tippee" may be held liable for the use of in-
side information absent a personally motivated gain to the insider. This
note undertakes an in-depth analysis of the Court's holding and underly-
ing rationale, concluding both to be without support and contrary to the
purpose of Rule 10b-5.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Rule lOb-5 is plain, concise and unambiguous," according to
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.' Other courts and some com-
mentators disagree.2 What is certain under Rule lOb-5 is that the
scope of insider trading and "tipper/tippee"3 liability is not
clearly defined. Since the Rule's promulgation, both the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the United States
1. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 96 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), cert. denied sub nom. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
(Rule lOb-5 is "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn"); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 470
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring) (Rule lOb-5 is "one of the most im-
portant and elusive provisions of the securities laws"); 1 A. BROMBERG & L. Low-
ENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAuD sections 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG] (Rule lob-5 is one of the broadest rules in cover-
age of persons and transactions); R. FROME & V. ROSENZWEIG, SALES OF SECURITIES
BY CORPORATE INSIDERS 85 (1972) ("it is not always clear which persons are con-
sidered insiders for purposes of rule l0b-5"); R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS 780 (2d ed. 1981) (Rule lob-5 is "broad, flexible, and not hedged
with qualifications or limiting doctrine").
3. The quotation marks are used in respect of the wishes of Professor Louis
Loss-the person who coined the word "tippee." 6 Loss, SEcURITIES REGULATION
3561 (2d ed. Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
Supreme Court have grappled with the wording and purpose of
the rule, and its effect on insider trading.4
Recently, the Supreme Court decided Dirks v. Securities and
Exchange Commission.5 The decision concluded the chronicle of
the massive fraud conducted by Equity Funding, first exposed in
1973 with the help of Mr. Dirks. The decision, however, did not
answer all of the questions raised by the Equity Funding scandal.
Instead, the opinion raised additional questions concerning the
scope of Rule lOb-5 as it pertains to insider trading.
The Court held a "tippee" is subject to the "disclose or abstain"
rule only where the insider-that is, the "tipper"--has breached
his fiduciary duty to the corporation or its shareholders. Accord-
ingly, the "tippee's" liability hinges upon the insider's actions. In
so holding, however, the Court engrafted a new "personal motiva-
tion" requirement on the fiduciary duty doctrine. An insider-and
derivatively, his "tippee"--does not breach his fiduciary duty to
the shareholders of a corporation by tipping inside information
unless he receives a personal benefit by so doing. The addition of
this requirement is unprecedented not only in the field of securi-
ties law, but also on the fiduciary duty doctrine itself.
This casenote explores the ramifications of the Dirks decision.
Initially, the note presents a general overview of insider trading;
the topic is canvassed from the enactment of section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 through the recent pre-Dirks judicial decisions. After a
brief factual background of the Dirks case, the note summarizes
the majority and dissenting opinions, and analyzes the Court's de-
cision. Discussed first is the Court's refusal to address whether
evidence of a crime constituted inside information. Next, the
newly imposed motivational requirement is examined in light of
the purposes underlying the securities law and Rule lOb-5. Ad-
dressing the merits of the case, the liability of Dirks under both
the "fiduciary duty" and the "misappropriation" theories is
presented. Finally, the doctrine of "constructive insider" and the
impact of the new motivation requirement are contemplated. The
note concludes that because of the heavy burden of proof now re-
quired of the SEC, insiders who receive hidden personal benefits
by tipping will remain unprosecuted.
4. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Ellind v. Liggett & My-
ers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. Securities and Exch.
Comm'n, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); In re
Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249 (1973); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
5. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comn'n, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
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II. HISTORY OF INSIDER TRADING UNDER RULE 10B-5 6
A. Origin of Rule 10b-57
In an effort to curb fraudulent practices in the field of securities,
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) .8 One of the purposes of the Exchange Act was "to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices on [the] exchanges and mar-
kets ..... 9 Included in the Exchange Act was section 10(b),10 the
objective of which is to protect investors by prohibiting fraud in
the purchase or sale of any security. A meager supply of informa-
tion existed, however, as to the legislative intent of section
10(b)." To add clarification, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 in
1942.12
6. Liability for insider trading may also be imposed under section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 896 (1934); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
This section covers specified insiders and imposes automatic liability for short-
swing profits made within a six month period. See 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL,
SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW section 10.01-.15(1972) [hereinafter cited
as BLOOMENTIHAL].
7. For in-depth treatment of Rule lob-5 see 3B BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 6, at
sections 9.01-.24; BROMBERG, supra note 2, passim; A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND
PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 (2d rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS]; 3
Loss, supra note 3, at 1421-1528.
8. 48 Stat. 881 (1934); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
9. Preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (1934)
(emphasis added).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
11. BROMBERG, supra note 2, at sections 2.2(300)-(332); 5 JACOBS, supra note 7,
section 5.01, at 1-159-60. The section, however, was clearly designed as a "'catch-all
clause to prevent manipulative devices.'" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 202 (1976) (quoting Thomas G. Corcoran, spokesperson for the drafters of the
statute).
12. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
Rule 10b-5 prohibits insiders from tipping, recommending, or
trading on the basis of inside information. 3 The Rule has also
been held to cover many types of fraud in the corpo-
rate/securities field. The Rule, however, was issued by the SEC
with an eye toward regulating insider trading.' 4 Conformably, the
policies underlying the rule should be accorded their fullest force
and effect in the context of insider trading cases.
Although Rule 10b-5 is supported by a paucity of administrative
history, eight policies have been cited as underlying the Rule. 15
Of those eight, two are of great significance. First, the policy of
protecting investors has the most legislative and administrative
support.16 This policy is of major import as it indicates Rule 10b-5
was intended to promote investor protection rather than merely
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
13. See 5A JACOBS, supra note 7, section 66.02[a] [i], at 3-399. According to
Jacobs:
An insider is a person who (1) possesses inside information, (2) knows or
should know the information is nonpublic, and (3) received the informa-
tion in his business capacity and for a legitimate business reason by vir-
tue of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to the
information....
A tippee is a person who (1) possesses inside information, (2) knows or
should know the information is nonpublic, (3) received the information
other than in his business capacity and for a legitimate business reason,
and (4) knows or should know the information "[sic] had been obtained
improperly by selective revelation or otherwise....
Id. section 66.02[a] [ii], at 3-416. "A tipper is someone who conveys material inside
information to a tippee." 5B id. section 164, at 7-2 (footnote omitted).
"Inside information" could be defined as nonpublic facts concerning the
business of an issuer, one of its securities, or the market for its securities,
and, insofar as the facts relate to the issuer's business, in the usual case
are intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone.
5A id. section 66.02[b], at 3-453.
14. "[The) SEC... emphasized the insider trading aspects of the Rule... to
make it emphatically clear that the Rule was expected to close ... loophole[s]." 5
id. section 5.02, at 1-163 (quoting Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. Securi-
ties and Exch. Comm'n, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
15. 5 JACOBS, supra note 7, at sections 6.01-.09. The policies referred to in-
clude: 1) maintaining free securities markets; 2) equalizing access to information;
3) insuring equal bargaining strength; 4) providing for disclosure; 5) protecting in-
vestors; 6) assuring fairness; 7) building investor confidence; and 8) deterring vio-
lations while compensating victims. These policies are said to reinforce one
another. Id. section 6.01, at 1-165-66.
16. According to section 10(b), the rule promulgated under it must be "in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." Moreover, in promulgating the
Rule, the SEC specifically stated the Rule was "necessary... for the protection of
investors .... " Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). For a better un-
derstanding of the policy of protecting investors see 5 JACOBS, supra note 7, sec-
tion 6.06, at 1-176-80.
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police insiders. Many authorities agree that under this policy,
Rule lOb-5 applies to sophisticated and unsophisticated investors
alike.17
The second major policy is one of fairness. Support for this pol-
icy lies within the body of the Exchange Act.18 The policy has its
basis in sound equitable principles. In addition, the fairness pol-
icy affords courts the flexibility necessary to meet all of the com-
plex practices and difficult ethical problems that can arise under
Rule 10b-5.19 When ruling on insider trading cases, courts should
strive to achieve these goals.
B. Insider Trading: Case Developments
Before the passage of the Exchange Act, corporate insiders had
been held liable for insider trading under three separate theories,
including the theory that a fiduciary duty was owed to the corpo-
ration and to its stockholders.20 Then came the passage of section
10(b) and the Exchange Act, and the subsequent promulgation of
Rule 10b-5. Initial judicial interpretation of the new Rule held cer-
tain insiders to a duty of disclosure. 21
The first case to extend the duty theory to "tippees" was In re
Cady, Roberts & Co.22 A broker-dealer had traded on the basis of
17. See 5 JACOBS, supra note 7, section 6.06, at 1-178, and authorities cited
therein.
18. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
19. 5 JACOBS, supra note 7, section 6.07. at 1-185.
20. The majority rule stated that officers and directors owed a fiduciary duty
to the corporation and to shareholders dealing with or on behalf of the corpora-
tion; as individuals, they owed no fiduciary duty to the shareholders. The minority
rule held corporate insiders to a fiduciary duty to the shareholders in all capaci-
ties. The third theory was the "special facts" doctrine developed by the Supreme
Court in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). This theory stated that an insider
might acquire a duty of disclosure where he was privy to special knowledge not
known to the purchaser of the stock. 3 Loss, supra note 3, at 1446-48.
21. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The court
stated:
Under any reasonably liberal construction, these provisions [section 10(b)
and Rule lob-Sl apply to directors and officers who, in purchasing the
stock of the corporation from others, fail to disclose a fact coming to their
knowledge by reason of their position, which would materially affect the
judgment of the other party to the transaction.
Id. at 800. According to Loss, although Kardon was the first judicial pronounce-
ment on Rule lOb-5, the Rule had been mentioned in passing in Baird v. Franklin,
141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). 3 Loss, supra note
3, at 1457.
22. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). For discussion concerning
Cady see Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAw. 939
inside information received from a director of another company.
In holding the broker-dealer liable for a violation of Rule lOb-5,
the SEC stated:
[Officers, directors, and controlling shareholders] do not exhaust the
classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation [to disclose].
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements: first, the exist-
ence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavaila-
ble to those with whom he is dealing.2 3
The first element in Cady required the showing of a r~lationship
affording access. The second element required the application of
the fairness policy to protect investors. Under the facts of the
case, the broker-dealer had met these two requirements for estab-
lishing a Rule lOb-5 violation and was therefore held liable as a
"tippee."
Seven years after Cady, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
decided Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur C0.24 The court restated the Cady test but omitted the
reference to a relationship.25 The court held:
Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must either dis-
close it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while
such inside information remains undisclosed.2 6
Thus, the court adopted the "disclose or abstain" rule. Moreover,
the court in effect held that mere possession of inside information
(1962); Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5; The
Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CH. L. REV. 121 (1962).
23. Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
24. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. Securities and
Exch. Comm'n, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
Texas Gulf Sulphur, an important case concerning many areas of Rule lOb-5 cov-
erage, has generated an abundance of discussion. See, e.g., S. GOLDBERG, SEC
TRADING RESTRICTIONS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR INSIDERS 83-103 (1973);
K. PATRICK, PERPETUAL JEOPARDY: THE Texas Gulf Sulphur Affair: A Chronicle of
Achievement and Misadventure (1972); Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas
Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. LJ. 731 (1968); Fleischer, Securities
Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases,
63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423 (1968); Sandier & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the
Securities Marketplace, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 225 (1969); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Ex-
panding Concepts of Corporate Disclosure Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 43 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 425 (1969); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Its Holdings and Implications, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 359 (1969).
25. The court felt the relationship aspect was not necessary. "Insiders ...
are, of course .... precluded from [unfair] dealing, but the Rule is also applicable
to one possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an 'in-
sider'...." 401 F.2d at 848.
26. Id.
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was sufficient to require a person to disclose before or abstain
from trading.
The last major insider trading decision prior to Dirks was
Chiarella v. United States.27 Mr. Chiarella worked for a financial
printer, handling documents containing tender offers of unidenti-
fied companies. On his own, Chiarella discovered the names of
the companies. Thereafter, he traded in those companies' securi-
ties to his profit. Chiarella was criminally convicted for this activ-
ity.28 The Supreme Court reversed.29
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, restated the Cady test, ad-
ding back the "relationship" reference omitted by the Texas Gulf
Sulphur court.30 Moreover, the Court's ruling pivoted on the rela-
tionship concept: "And the duty to disclose arises when one party
has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know be-
cause of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confi-
dence between them.' "31 Pursuing the point, the Court held that
a duty to disclose "des not arise from the mere possession of
nonpublic market information."32 The Court, however, mentioned
"tippee" liability only in passing dicta.33
Chiarella demonstrates that an insider's liability turns on the
duty one owes. According to the Court, Mr. Chiarella had no fidu-
27. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For articles concerning Chiarella and its ef-
fects see Cann, A Duty to Disclose? An Analysis of Chiarella v. United States, 85
DICK. L. REV. 249 (1981); Deutsch, Chiarella v. United States: A Study in Legal
Style, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1291 (1980); Deutsch, The New Deal and the Burger Court:
The Significance of U.S. v. Chiarella, 57 TEx. L REV. 965 (1979); Heller, Chiarella,
SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAw. 517
(1982); Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatemen4 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1982); Comment, Rationalizing Liability for Non.
disclosure Under 10b-5: Equal Access to Information and United States v.
Chiarella, 1980 Wis. L REV. 162; Pitt, Chiarella Court: Limits on Novel 10b-5 Ac-
tions, Legal Times of Wash., Mar. 31, 1980, at 12.
28. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
29. 445 U.S. at 225.
30. Id. at 227. The Court stated. "The Commission emphasized that the duty
arose from (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside informa-
tion intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading
without disclosure." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
31. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 551(2) (a) (1977)).
32. 445 U.S. at 235. Thus, the Court rejected the "possession" test adopted by
the Texas Gulf Sulphur court. This holding has been interpreted as applying to all
material inside information rather than merely nonpublic market information. See
Langevoort, supra note 27, at 42-43.
33. See infra note 126.
ciary duty or relationship of trust and confidence with the share-
holders.34 Without that duty, he was not an insider,35 and could
not be liable for his trading and subsequent profits. The stage
was then set for the decision in Dirks.
11. FACTUAL HISTORY OF DIRKS 3 6
Raymond Dirks was an investment analyst with Delafield
Childs, a New York broker-dealer firm. His speciality was insur-
ance company securities.37 On March 6, 1973, Ronald Secrist con-
tacted Dirks. Secrist had recently been fired from a vice-
president's position at Equity Funding of America. Equity Fund-
ing was a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life
insurance. Secrist alleged that the company was engaged in a
massive fraud,w and that the SEC had failed to act on similar
charges made by other employees. 39 Secrist had told the same
story to New York insurance regulators earlier that day.40
After a preliminary investigation of certain Equity Funding
records which neither confirmed nor disproved the allegations,
Dirks had a list drawn up on March 12 of his firm's clients who
held Equity Funding securities. He informed two of the clients
that same day and began his investigation-throughout which he
34. 445 U.S. at 232-33.
35. "[Chiarellal was, in fact, a complete stranger .... " Id.
36. The facts and opinion of this case must be distinguished from the recent
proceedings against Mr. Dirks.
In June of 1983, Dirks was found to have engaged in a fraudulent scheme in
violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
and Rule lOb-5. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). Dirks has appealed the decision. See 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) no. 49, at
2264 (1983).
In December, 1983, Dirks was barred by an SEC administrative law judge from
any supervisory, managerial, financial, principal, or proprietary association with
any broker-dealer. This was the result of a determination by the judge that Dirks
had aided and abetted a violation of the SEC's net capital rule and had violated
section 14(b) of the SIPA. 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) no. 1, at 6-7 (1984).
37. Dirks was Senior Vice-President in charge of the Dirks Brothers Division
of Delafleld Childs. In re Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., [19781 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 81,705 at 80,819 [hereinafter cited as Initial Decision] (initial
decision of Administrative Law Judge David Markun).
38. Subsequent to Secrist's initial tip, Dirks spoke with other past and then-
present employees of Equity Funding including Patrick Hopper, an officer and ma-
jor shareholder who had recently left his position at Equity Funding. Hopper and
the others partially corroborated Secrist's story. Id. at 80,840-44.
39. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824, 829-30 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The two men met the following day and Secrist detailed a list of allegations. Some
turned out to be true, others false. When the fraud was finally publicly disclosed,
it was discovered that Equity Funding had created false insurance policies,
records, sales, and assets. Id. at 829-33.
40. Id. at 832 n.6.
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continued to selectively inform other clients.41 On March 19 and
20, Dirks contacted the Wall Street Journal which began its own
investigation on March 21. On March 23, a reporter for the Jour-
nal related the story to the SEC which began an investigation on
March 26.42
On March 27, the New York Stock Exchange halted Equity
Funding trading. The SEC suspended trading in Equity Funding
securities the following day. The price of Equity Funding stock
had dropped from $26 to $15 during the two-week period of Dirks'
investigation. Dirks' clients had rid themselves of close to $15
million worth of Equity Funding stock and debentures during the
same period as a result of Dirks' information. 43 Thereafter, the
fraudulent practices at Equity Funding became public.
In an administrative hearing, Dirks and five of his clients" were
found to have violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,4 5
section 10(b), and Rule 10b-5. Dirks was suspended from associa-
tion with any broker-dealer for 60 days and all but one of his cli-
ents were censured.46 The SEC subsequently reduced Dirks'
sanction to that of a censure.
47
41. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3269 (1983) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
42. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The Journal published an Equity Funding press release on March 28, but did not
publish a story on the scandal itself until April 2, when the SEC filed a complaint
against Equity Funding. The Journal reporter who investigated Dirks' information
and wrote the subsequent article was later nominated for a Pulitzer Prize for his
coverage of the fraud. Id. at 832.
43. 103 S. Ct. at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. Initial Decision, supra note 37, at 80,867. The five institutional investors in-
volved were the following: The Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc.; The
Dreyfus Corporation; John W. Bristol & Co., Inc.; Tomlin, Zimmerman & Parmalee,
Inc.; and Manning & Napier. Id.
45. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Section
17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
46. Initial Decision, supra note 37, at 80,867.
47. In re Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401 (1981). Dirks was the only party to ap-
peal the Initial Decision. Id.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
Dirks' censure based upon the SEC's opinion.48 Judge Wright is-
sued an opinion stating that an insider's fiduciary duty automati-
cally passes to a "tippee" with the tip, and in the alternative, a
"tippee" has a duty to the SEC and to the investing public.49 One
judge concurred in the result, the other judge dissented.50 The
Supreme Court granted Dirks' petition for writ of certiorari.51
IV. THE DIRKS DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The majority began its opinion with a relatively abbreviated fac-
tual history of the case.52 From the start, the direction in which
the Court headed was clear: the facts were narrated with a ten-
dency of bias in favor of Dirks and Secrist 53 and against the
SEC.54 As a result, the gains to Secrist 5 and to Dirks,56 and the
48. The judgment was unreported. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, No.
81-1243 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1982) (per curiam) (affirming decision of the SEC).
49. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
50. Neither judge filed an opinion. Id. at 828. Thus the lengthy appellate court
decision contained the views of only one judge. Undoubtedly, this was an impor-
tant consideration for the Supreme Court in deciding whether to grant Dirks' peti-
tion for writ of certiorari.
51. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
52. The factual history of the case was extremely long and complex. For an
excellent and detailed account, see Judge Wright's appellate decision. Dirks v. Se-
curities and Exch. Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824, 828-33 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
53. For example, the Court stated: "[T]hroughout his investigation ...
[Dirks] openly discussed the information he had obtained.. ."; Dirks "was in
touch regularly" with the Wall Street Journal whom he "urged . . . to write a
story;" Dirks "spread word of Secrist's charges" over a "two week period." 103 S.
Ct. at 3258. In addition, the Court stated that Dirks played a "central role" through
which his "careful investigation brought to light a massive fraud .... But for
Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone undetected longer." Id. at 3263 n.18.
These statements indicate the Court felt Dirks' actions were all above board.
54. For example, the Court stated, "As early as 1971, the SEC had received al-
legations of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding." 103 S. Ct. at 3259
n.3. The Court continued, "Only then [after Dirks' efforts caused the New York
Stock Exchange to halt trading] did the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) file a complaint against Equity Funding... ." Id. at 3259 (footnote omit-
ted). These statements indicate the Court felt the SEC was overly lax and
inefficient.
55. Secrist's underlying intent was to cause the stock to plummet. See infra
notes 131-36 and accompanying text. Secrist's personal benefit was the satisfac-
tion of achieving his goal. The majority did not mention Secrist's motivations
other than the claimed motive to expose the fraud. 103 S. Ct. at 3258.
56. The majority stated uncertainty existed as to whether Dirks actually re-
ceived any compensation for his disclosures to his clients. 103 S. Ct. at 3258 n.2.
However, the custom of the brokerage industry was succinctly stated in the Initial
Decision: Compensation of Dirks' services "was obtained indirectly from securities
transactions directed by their clients through the Delafield Childs trading depart-
ment." Initial Decision, supra note 37 at 80,819. Delafield Childs did in fact receive
[Vol. 12: 93, 1984] Dirks v. SEC
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
harm to the Equity Funding shareholders5 7 were glossed over
where mentioned.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority58 as he did in Chiarella,
reaffirmed the holding of Chiarella: A duty to disclose or abstain
arises from a fiduciary relationship and not from the mere posses-
sion of nonpublic market information.5 9 The Court then analyzed
how a "tippee" could be held liable for a violation of Rule lOb-5.
In their analysis, the majority rejected the SEC view that "tip-
pees" who receive material nonpublic inside information assume
the duties of the insider.60 The Court believed the view was too
similar to the SEC argument rejected by the Chiarella Court.
Justice Powell stated the two SEC arguments were based upon
the invalid "equal information" theory-the theory that all inves-
tors must be apprised of the same information before trading.61
additional business as a result of Dirks' knowledge. Dirks v. Securities and Exch.
Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
In addition to the business Dirks gained for Delafield Childs, he gained an en-
hanced reputation in the brokerage community. Once the fraud was publicly ex-
posed, it was the subject of countless articles. See, e.g., Cole, Phone Call Set Off
Equity Funding Scandal, N.Y. Times, April 6, 1973, at 1, col. 4; see also the Wall
Street Journal series: Herman, How Ronald H. Secrist Sank Equity Funding with
Two Phone Calls, Wall Street Journal, May 8, 1973, at 1, col. 4; Meyer, Digging
Deeper, Equity Scandal Grows, Involves $120 Million in Nonexistent Assets, April
24, 1973, at 1, col. 6; Elia, Before the Fall, Many Officers Sold Equity Funding Stock
Before Scandal Broke, April 20, 1973, at 1, col. 6; Rustin & Meyer, Ear to the
Ground, How the Word Spread about Equity Funding; Was it Inside Data? April 9,
1973, at 1, col. 6; Blundell, A Scandal Unfolds, Some Assets Missing, Insurance
Called Bogus at Equity Funding, April 2, 1973, at 1, col. 6. The name recognition
alone that Dirks received as a result of those articles must have been enormous.
57. The shareholders lost millions of dollars. See 103 S. Ct. at 3258.
58. In addition to Justice Powell, the majority included Chief Justice Burger,
Justice White, Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor.
59. 103 S. Ct. at 3261.
60. Id. at 3262.
61. According to the Court, the SEC in Chiarella argued that anyone who re-
ceives inside information incurs a duty to disclose or abstain; and the SEC in
Dirks argued that anyone who receives inside information from an insider incurs a
fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain. Each argument merely states the same point:
all investors should have equal access to information before trading. 103 S. Ct. at
3261-63.
The Court, however, misread the SEC's argument in Dirks. The SEC argued a
"tippee" inherits the fiduciary duty of the insider who has passed along inside in-
formation. The insider's fiduciary duty is to either disclose or abstain from trading
based upon inside information. If the insider tips the inside information without
disclosure, he is liable for all subsequent trading without disclosure by the "tip-
pee" (and "tippees" of the "tippee"). If a trade without disclosure occurs, the in-
sider has breached his duty. The "tippee," because he inherited the duty, would
also inherit the breach. The "tippee" would thus be liable as well.
The majority rejected the SEC's "inherit a duty" argument. Instead, the major-
According to Justice Powell, this theory would "have an inhibiting
influence on the role of market analysts....
However, "[t]he need for a ban on some tippee trading is
clear."63 Consequently, the Court held that because tipping is an
indirect means of violating the "disclose or abstain" rule, a "tip-
pee" assumes an insider's fiduciary duty only when the insider
has breached his duty by disclosing the inside information to the
"tippee" and the "tippee" knows or should know that a breach
exists.64
Hence, to determine the liability of the "tippee", the focus is
placed on the insider. Did the insider breach his fiduciary duty
by tipping inside information?65 The Court declared the only time
the fiduciary duty is breached occurs when the insider personally
benefits: "[TI he test is whether the insider personally will benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." 66 If the insider does
not breach, then the "tippee" cannot be held liable. 67 The Court
drew its support for this new "personal motivation" requirement
from a footnote in Cady stating that "a purpose of the securities
laws was to eliminate 'use of inside information for personal
advantage.' "68
According to the Court, this requirement of personal motivation
is easily proven 69-- courts need simply look to "objective facts and
ity stated a "tippee" is only liable where the insider breaches. In effect then, the
majority held a "tippee" inherits the insider's breach. The result is the same as in
the SEC's argument, except the addition of the motivation requirement. Id.
62. 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
63. Id. At this point, rather than expounding upon why the ban is needed, the
majority simply added that the insider must not personally gain. Id. The majority
seemed to imply "tippee" trading is only wrong where the insider personally
benefits.
64. The Court prefaced this holding by stating that "some tippees must as-
sume an insider's duty to the shareholders not because they receive inside infor-
mation, but rather because it has been made available to them improperly." Id. at
3264 (emphasis in original).
Clearly, the Court, while claiming to reject the SEC's argument, had actually
adopted a modified version. The Court added a qualification so that the duty is
inherited only when inside information is made available "improperly." In theory,
disclosure should be improper in all instances except when made for a legitimate
business reason. Surely, Secrist did not tip for such a reason. See infra notes 131-
36 and accompanying text regarding Secrist's intentions.
65. 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
66. The Court continued: "Absent some personal gain, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no
derivative breach." Id. (footnote omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)). The
majority also drew support from a concurring opinion in In re Investors Manage-
ment Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 648 (1971) (Smith, Commissioner, concurring in the re-
sult). The statement was to the effect that the focus of insider trading should be
to police the conduct of insiders.
69. But see infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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circumstances" from which can be inferred the requisite motiva-
tion.70 The Court omitted describing what constitutes "objective
facts and circumstances." Instead, Justice Powell recited two pos-
sible situations involving requisite motivation: 1) the insider re-
ceives something of value in return for the information, and 2) the
insider exploits the information by giving it to a friend or rela-
tive.7 1 It is unclear whether the majority meant to limit the moti-
vational requirement to those two situations, or whether the
situations are just two of many unknown "objective facts and
circumstances." 72
The majority summarized by holding that Secrist clearly had no
personal motivation.73 Without motivation, he did not breach his
fiduciary duty.74 Therefore, Dirks could not have derivatively
breached that duty.7 5 Since he did not breach, Dirks could not be
liable under Rule lOb-5 as a "tippee."76 The judgment of censure
was therefore reversed.7 7
Of note is the majority's approval in a footnote of the doctrine
known as that of the "constructive insider."78 The doctrine was
not crucial to the case; rather, it was merely dicta. Moreover, the
Court simply restated a pre-existing concept in securities law.
The doctrine, however, has received widespread attention. The
constructive insider doctrine and its effect are discussed in Sec-
tion IV, Part D of this casenote.79
70. 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
71. Id. The majority reached this conclusion by citing a comment by Professor
Brudney. Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REV. 324, 348 (1979). But as the dissent
pointed out, Professor Brudney merely recognized that the most common motive
for breaching one's fiduciary duty is personal gain. 103 S. Ct. at 3270 n.6 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
72. The Court simply neglected to explicate further.
73. "[Secrist] received no monetary or personal benefit .... [T]he tippers
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud." Id. at 3267-68.
74. Id. at 3267.
75. "[Tlhere was no derivative breach by Dirks." Id. at 3268.
76. "Dirks therefore could not have been 'a participant after the fact in [an]
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty.'" Id. (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 320 n.12).
77. 103 S. Ct. at 3268. After stating their new ruling, the majority applied the
rule with little analysis. Basically, the majority stated the case hinged on Secrist's
intent which they viewed, without discussion, as laudable. Id. at 3266-68.
78. 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
79. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
B. The Dissent
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent,80 chided the majority
for imposing "a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the
duty owed by insiders to shareholders." 81 The dissent viewed the
holding as another opinion limiting the scope of section 10(b),
thereby frustrating the congressional intent of protecting inves-
tors from detrimental and fraudulent practices.8 2 The dissent
pointedly indicated the majority had no support for its holding.83
The dissent began its analysis by illustrating the scope and pur-
pose of an insider's fiduciary duty. The duty is imposed so as to
prevent unfair injury to shareholders.84 The focus of the duty is
on the insider's actions and the resulting effect on the sharehold-
ers; the focus is not on the insider's motives.8 5 Thus, the dissent
concluded the majority's motivational requirement was not only
ill-imposed, but also contrary to the doctrine of fiduciary duty and
to the purposes underlying the Exchange Act from which Rule
lOb-5 is derived.86
Even with the addition of the motivational requirement, how-
ever, the dissent believed that Secrist had the requisite personal
motivation.8 7 Secrist contacted Dirks with the intention that
Dirks pass the information on to his clients who would then un-
load their stock on the unsuspecting market.8 8 Secrist's intent, the
dissent stated, was to injure the present and subsequent share-
holders of Equity Funding stock.89 However, Secrist had a duty
to those purchasers to disclose.90 This he failed to do; conse-
quently, he breached his fiduciary duty.91 Because Dirks knew of
80. In addition to Justice Blackmun, the dissenters included Justice Brennan
and Justice Marshall.
81. 103 S. Ct. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 3268.
83. "The novelty of this limitation is reflected in the Court's lack of support for
it." Id. at 3270 (footnote omitted).
84. 'That relationship assures the shareholder that the insider may not take
actions that will harm him unfairly." Id. See also id. at n.8.
85. 'The duty is addressed not to the insider's motives, but to his actions and
their consequences. . . ." Id. at 3271 (footnote omitted).
86. Justice Blackmun presented a wealth of authority for his views. He
demonstrated that prohibiting personal gain is only one of many purposes behind
the securities laws. He also examined the scope of the insider's fiduciary duty and
how it is breached. Id. at 3270-72.
87. The dissent believed Secrist "intended Dirks to injure the purchasers of
Equity Funding securities to whom Secrist had a duty to disclose." Id. at 3270.
88. "Secrist used Dirks ... " Id. (emphasis added).
89. See supra note 87.
90. 103 S. Ct. at 3269-70.
91. The dissent pointedly indicated "[n]o one questions that Secrist himself
could not trade on his inside information." Id. at 3269. Moreover, the dissent
stressed that even the majority admitted "Secrist could not do by proxy what he
was prohibited from doing personally." Id. at 3270 (citing 103 S. Ct. at 3263).
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Secrist's intent and of the breach, Dirks aided and abetted the vi-
olation of Rule 10b-5.92
Justice Blackmun also objected to the majority's policy wherein
the end justifies the means.93 Secrist and Dirks exposed a mas-
sive fraud at Equity Funding. The dissent believed that the ma-
jority held that Dirks should not be censured because the overall
public benefit outweighed the harm to the shareholders who
traded with Dirks' clients. 94 The dissent could not subscribe to a
result which rewarded Dirks for taking advantage of, while help-
ing to expose, the fraud at Equity Funding.95
The dissent concluded both Secrist and Dirks violated their du-
ties to disclose or abstain, thereby violating section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.96 Moreover, because Dirks was himself liable, the dis-
sent stated it was irrelevant that the SEC did not bring an action
against Secrist.97 Overall, the dissent believed the majority opin-
ion would allow crafty insiders to trade up and tip with impunity,
thus "opening a hole in the congressionally mandated prohibition
on insider trading . ..."98 Henceforth, Justice Blackmun feared,
insiders and their "tippees" will be rewarded for their cunning in
obtaining covert gains.99
V. ANALYSIS' 0 0
A. Evidence of a Crime Constitutes Inside Information
The SEC found, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
92. Dirks was the person who caused his clients to trade; the trading without
disclosure was the violation. 103 S. Ct. at 3274 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. Justice Blackmun wrote: "The Court justifies Secrist's and Dirks' action
because the general benefit derived from the violation . . .outweighed the harm
caused ... in other words, because the end justifies the means." Id. at 3272-73.
94. Id.
95. The dissent believed, "Under this view, the benefit conferred on society
... may be paid for with the losses caused to shareholders trading with Dirks' cli-
ents." Id. at 3273 (footnote omitted). The dissent continued by reminding the ma-
jority, "A person cannot condition his transmission of information of a crime on a
financial award." Id.
96. "Any other result is a disservice to this country's attempt to provide fair
and efficient capital markets." Id. at 3274.
97. "The fact that the SEC ... did not charge Secrist ... says nothing about
the applicable law." Id. at 3273 n.16.
98. Id. at 3274.
99. Id. at 3273-74.
100. Before the final Dirks decision was announced, the case had received
widespread analysis. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production ofInformation, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 337-38; Heiler,
agreed, that the information of a massive fraud, passed from Se-
crist to Dirks, constituted material inside information. The major-
ity, however, avoided the issue; they assumed the findings below
were correct for the purpose of deciding the remainder of the
case. 01 In contrast, the dissent impliedly indicated the informa-
tion was indeed inside and material.102
The issue should have been determined. It was of utmost im-
portance to the final decision of the case. The issue had been de-
termined in the SEC administrative proceeding103 and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.0 4 Dirks sought review of the issue in his
petition for writ of certiorari.l05 Dirks, the SEC, and the United
States Solicitor General briefed the issue to the Supreme
Court.106 Of greater import, had the Court determined the infor-
mation was not material and inside, the opinion would have
ended there-the decision as to the issue of "duty" would have
been unnecessary. Therefore, the majority should have con-
fronted the issue rather than merely assume the correctness of
the determination for purposes of the Dirks opinion alone. Conse-
quently, the question remains open.
The question is easily answered. Inside information is defined
as nonpublic facts concerning the business of an issuer which, in
the usual case, are intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose.107 Applying this definition to the facts in Dirks, the evi-
dence of a crime, namely fraud, clearly constituted material in-
side information.
First, the information was clearly nonpublic. The fraud had
continued over a period of years without being exposed. 08 Al-
Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus.
LAw. 517 (1982); Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information, and the Regulators,
21 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1973); Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary
Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAIF. L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1982); Scott,
Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
801, 813-14 (1980).
101. The Court merely stated: "We need not decide [the issue]." 103 S. Ct. at
3266 n.25. The Court, without justification, gave no reasons why. One possible rea-
son for refusing to explicitly rule on the issue could be fear of riling Congress and
thereby further delaying the passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983.
Exercising a bit of judicial cunning, Justice Powell, however, hinted how the Court
might later rule: "[Wie assume the correctness of the SEC's findings ... that
[Dirks] was a tippee of material inside information." Id. (emphasis added).
102. "Secrist ... could not trade on his inside information ... " 103 S. Ct. at
3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
103. Initial Decision, supra note 37.
104. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824 (1982).
105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21-25.
106. See Brief for Petitioner at 28-31; Brief for Respondent at 45-49; Brief of the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 18-26.
107. See supra note 13.
108. "[Equity Funding] had made bogus entries in its books since 1964 and, be-
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though an occasional rumor may have surfaced throughout the
years, the integrity of Equity Funding remained intact. The first
public report concerning the Equity Funding fraud did not appear
until the Wall Street Journal published an article on April 2, 1973,
based on Dirks' information.109
Second, the requirement that inside information contain "facts"
is not limited to presently existing circumstances; it includes
opinions, estimates, and predictions.10 Thus, it was irrelevant
that Secrist initially tipped the information without any "hard"
documentation."' Secrist's opinion that ongoing fraud existed-
which Dirks believed-was sufficient.
Third, the information of fraud concerned the business. In fact,
the fraud not only went to the heart of the business, but also con-
sisted of almost two-thirds of Equity Funding's ostensibly issued
life insurance policies.1 2 Tangentially, the information also con-
cerned the market for Equity Funding's securities, for once the
fraud was publicly disclosed, the market was sure to plunge."13
Fourth, some authorities conclude that to be inside, the infor-
mation must have been intended for a corporate purpose.1 4 How-
ever, if the inside information concerns the market for the
security, this element is usually not required. Moreover, when-
ever required, it is usually satisfied where the tip concerns a com-
pany's business." 5 As indicated, the information concerned the
ginning in 1970, had manufactured increasing amounts of wholly fictitious insur-
ance." In re Dirks, [1981] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 82,812, at 83,944 (footnote
omitted).
109. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3259 (1983).
110. 5A JACOBS, supra note 7, section 66.02[b], at 3-454.
111. Secrist did not offer Dirks any "hard" information, e.g., documents. It is
highly unlikely that he could have in view of the fact that traces of fraud were so
well covered. Instead, he merely informed Dirks that he had discovered through
contacts that a massive fraud was under way. Dirks v. Securities and Exch.
Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824, 830 (1982).
112. "Of more than $3 billion worth of life insurance ostensibly issued by EFCA
[Equity Funding], over $2 billion proved to be fictitious. More than $85 million in
purported profits had been generated by the fraudulent scheme." In re Dirks,
[19811 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 82.812 at 83,944 n.19.
113. The market to sell or buy a firm's securities can easily be touched off. For
example, a report of changes in dividend rates can raise or lower the price. of the
firm's securities. Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information, and the Regula-
tors, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 n.39 (1973). It thus becomes evident that a public dis-
closure that two-thirds of Equity Funding's life insurance policies were
nonexistent would be certain to send the price of its stock on a downward spiral.
114. See 5A JACOBS, supra note 7, section 66.02[b), at 3-454 to -446.
115. Id.
tip; this element is therefore satisfied.
Finally, the size and scope of the fraud indicated its materiality.
The tip would be sure to influence any investor's decision to buy
or sell. Moreover, the materiality is enhanced when the informa-
tion of the tip-i.e., the knowledge of the ongoing fraud-is cou-
pled with the knowledge that public disclosure of the fraud is
imminent. Any investor would sell stock today to limit losses
rather than watch his fortune become completely worthless to-
morrow. Without doubt, the tip of ongoing fraud was material
nonpublic inside information.
B. The Personal Motivation Requirement
The majority in Dirks held a fiduciary does not breach his fidu-
ciary duty absent personal gain.116 This far-reaching decision is
without support. The majority based its holding on a footnote
from Cady that one of the purposes of securities laws is to pre-
vent personal gain through the use of inside information."i7 In so
holding, the Court not only ignored the other purposes of the Ex-
change Act, section 10(b), and Rule lOb-5-most importantly, pro-
tection of investors and fairness-but also effectively eliminated
those purposes from Rule lOb-5. Moreover, the Court rewrote the
concept of fiduciary duty;118 an insider-fiduciary can now harm a
company's shareholders without liability so long as he does not
personally benefit.
Two of the basic policies of the Exchange Act from which Rule
lOb-5 stems are fairness and the protection of investors. 119 Justice
Powell and the majority in effect recognized these principles in
their restatement of the Cady rule in Chiarella: "The Commission
emphasized that the duty arose from . . . the unfairness of al-
lowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that [inside] infor-
mation by trading without disclosure.' 120 If an insider is allowed
to make unfair use of inside information, investors-including
subsequent shareholders-are not protected. Therefore, in order
to uphold these congressionally mandated policies, the Chiarella
Court adopted the rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 12 1
that "the duty to disclose arises when one party has information
116. 103 S. Ct. at 3265. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
118. But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (The Court
"must be wary against interpolating [its] notions of policy in the interstices of leg-
islative provisions."); Bank v. Sherman, 101 U.S. 403, 406 (1879) ("It is our business
to execute the law as we find it, and not to make or modify it.").
119. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
120. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (quoting In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (a) (1977).
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'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.'"122 In short, the fiduciary relation alone requires disclo-
sure before trading or tipping based upon material inside infor-
mation. If an insider trades (or tips and the "tippee" trades)
without disclosure, then a breach of the fiduciary duty occurs-re-
gardless of the motivation of the insider-fiduciary.
Joining the policies of the Exchange Act (and Rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder)123 with the decision of Chiarella and
the fiduciary duty concept,124 Rule lOb-5 clearly was intended only
to prohibit, among other fraudulent practices, the use of inside in-
formation for personal gain. Neither Congress nor the SEC in-
tended to make personal motivation or personal gain an element
of a Rule lOb-5 violation. 25 It follows that a breach of the fiduci-
ary duty is sufficient to impose liability for a violation of Rule lOb-
5.126 As such, the additional requirement of personal motivation
was groundless.
Why did the Court impose the personal benefit requirement on
the fiduciary duty concept? This question undoubtedly will be
long debated. One possible reason for the majority's action is be-
122. 445 U.S. at 228 (1980).
123. Cf. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774-75 (1979) (primary purposes
of the Securities Act of 1933 are the protection of investors, and "to achieve a high
standard of business ethics... in every facet of the securities industry.') (quoting
S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963) (emphasis
added)).
124. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-
Chiarella Restatemen4 70 CAuF. L. REV. 1 (1982) (discussing the fiduciary duty).
125. See 5 JACOBS, supra note 7, sections 5, 5.01 and 5.02 (discussing the legisla-
tive history of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
126. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980), the Court stated:
"Tippees" of corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10(b) be-
cause they have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information
that they know is confidential and know or should know came from a cor-
porate insider .... The tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising
from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fi-
duciary duty.
The first sentence of the quote seems to imply that even where the in-
sider/"tipper" does not breach his fiduciary duty, the "tippee" can still be held lia-
ble for trading based upon the tipped inside information. The second sentence of
the quote seems to contradict the first; specifically the insider must first breach his
fiduciary duty before the "tippee" can be held liable for subsequent trading. The
Court finally cleared up the discrepancy in Dirks by holding the insider must first
breach before a "tippee" can be held liable. But see 5A JACOBS, supra note 7, sec-
tion 66.02[aI [iii] [C], at 3-439 (offering three considerations demonstrating a "tip-
pee" should be held liable for insider trading although the "tipper" breached no
fiduciary duty).
cause Dirks played a major role in exposing a massive fraud. The
fraud had continued for nine years before Dirks' efforts helped
bring about public disclosure. By his actions, Dirks had achieved
a beneficial result for the general public good. In some respects,
he could be considered a "hero."127
A second possible reason for the ruling is that the Court was
greatly influenced by the United States Solicitor General. The So-
licitor General authorized the SEC to oppose Dirks' appeal; he
sided, however, with Dirks. In opposition to the SEC, the Solici-
tor General echoed Dirks in urging that the petition'for writ of
certiorari be granted. After the Court agreed to hear the case, the
Solicitor General filed a lengthy brief as amicus curiae in support
of Dirks.128
Neither reason, however, was sufficient to support the Court's
ruling. Dirks' censure did not discourage or inhibit insurance
analysts in their investigative roles. The Court cited no evidence
indicating analysts had become inhibited since the censure was
originally imposed on Dirks. The imposition of the censure
merely indicated analysts must perform their duties honestly; the
information must first be disclosed to the public before an analyst
may use it to his own, and/or his client's, personal advantage. In
sum, no basis in either the legislative history of the securities
laws or in public policy existed for the announcement of the per-
sonal motivation requirement. The requirement was ill-conceived
and wrongly imposed.129
127. A "hero" is normally not censured for his "heroic" conduct. The majority
did not want to censure Dirks for this conduct. However, the Court faced a prob-
lem: under existing law, Secrist had breached his fiduciary duty to Equity Funding
shareholders and purchasers by causing undisclosed trading in Equity Funding
securities based upon inside information passed along to Dirks. Dirks aided and
abetted the breach by selectively tipping Delafield Childs' clients. In short, Dirks
had violated Rule lOb-5. The majority, therefore, needed a way to get Dirks off the
hook. Their method was the imposition of the personal motivation requirement.
128. The SEC filed an opposition brief to Dirks' petition for a writ of certiorari.
The Solicitor General authorized the brief, but refused to join. Instead, he in-
serted a footnote at the close of the SEC brief contradicting the SEC's arguments
and urging Dirks' petition be granted. After the granting of the petition, the Solici-
tor General submitted a brief as amicus curiae in support of Dirks' position.
Clearly, Dirks' attack on the SEC's position was backed by the full weight of the
United States Government. Of course, the United States does not win all of its
cases, nor does it coerce the Supreme Court into succumbing to its wishes. How-
ever, with the United States siding against one of its most respected administra-
tive agencies and urging the overturning of Dirks' censure was essential in order
to preserve the investigative role of insurance analysts, the Supreme Court could
not help but be influenced.
129. "Even on the extraordinary facts of this case, such an innovation is not
justified." 103 S. Ct. at 3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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C. Was Rule 10b-5 Violated?
1. Fiduciary Duty Theory
Clearly, without the new motivational requirement, Secrist
breached his fiduciary duty. He tipped Dirks who in turn tipped
clients who traded without disclosure. Under Chiarella, this con-
stituted a breach of duty by Secrist. Dirks then became liable for
his derivative breach of tipping to clients who traded without
disclosure.
The majority, however, imposed the motivational requirement
on the fiduciary duty. The issue then became what was Secrist's
intention in tipping without disclosure. The Court debated the is-
sue. The majority simply stated Secrist intended only to expose
the Equity Funding fraud;i3 0 Justice Powell stated his conclusion
but proffered little analysis. The dissent, however, was wary of
the new requirement; they scrutinized Secrist's motives more
closely.
Secrist had been fired from his office at Equity Funding. He
subsequently informed Dirks of what he believed concerning the
fraudulent practices at Equity Funding.131 However, in order that
he not "look like a disgruntled employee trying to get even
* . .,",132 Secrist told Dirks he had quit his Equity Funding job.
Moreover, Secrist wanted the information passed to Dirks' cli-
ents. 33 His stated intentions were to "jar" the stock price and the
corporate officers, 3 4 to bring the stock price "close to zero very
quickly" 35 and "to put on as much heat as possible and as fast as
possible."136
In view of his testimony, Secrist intended for much more to oc-
cur than the mere public disclosure of the fraud. 3 7 The dissent
concluded Secrist intended to injure subsequent shareholders of
130. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3268 (1983).
131. Joint Appendix of Appellant and Respondent at 14-28 (testimony of Ronald
Secrist before hearing examiner).
132. Secrist was afraid that telling Dirks he had been fired "Would cloud the is-
sue." Id. at 20.
133. Secrist stated: "I expected him [Dirks] to disseminate this information to
his firm's customers, clients." Id. at 25.
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id. at 27.
136. Id. at 16.
137. The author is not passing judgment upon Mr. Secrist's actions or inten-
tions. Rather, the author is merely summarizing Mr. Secrist's testimony and the
opinion of the dissent. The reader is left to draw his own conclusions.
Equity Funding for unknown personal reasons. The dissent felt,
however, that Secrist's intentions were sufficient to satisfy the
personal motivation requirement. Secrist's personal gain was the
achievement of his intended goal. Therefore, Secrist breached his
fiduciary duty. Dirks was liable for the derivative breach. 138 The
dissent had more support for their position than did the majority.
In short, the dissenters had the better reasoned analysis demon-
strating a breach of fiduciary duty.139 With or without the new
motivational requirement, Dirks violated Rule lOb-5 under the fi-
duciary duty theory.
2. Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation rule prohibits the recipient of information
from another (whether or not obtained by misappropriation)
"from converting the information to his own personal ends (if it
was not so intended) by trading on the basis of information or by
tipping someone else who so trades."140 Liability pivots on two is-
sues: 1) whether the information was created by another, and 2)
whether the information was intended to be a basis for trading or
tipping.14' The fiduciary duty theory and the misappropriation
theory are not mutually exclusive. 142
The dissent did not reach the question of misappropriation al-
though statements by Justice Blackmun alluded to it.143 The ma-
jority, however, flatly stated that Dirks was not guilty of
misappropriation. 4 4 This bold statement of the majority was also
the extent of their analysis into the misappropriation question.
Consequently, this fiat pronouncement cannot plausibly be con-
sidered an inroad into the theory. As a result, the theory remains
viable.
In order to find a violation of Rule 10b-5 under the misappropri-
ation theory, the focus must be placed upon the actions of both
the "tipper" and the "tippee." Secrist did not create the informa-
tion of the fraud-i.e., he was not the source of the information.
138. 103 S. Ct. at 3270, 3274 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. If the personal motivation requirement must be imposed, it should be
given a liberal application-as demonstrated by the dissent. Otherwise, the SEC
is apt to face insurmountable burdens of proof in some cases. See infra notes 157-
59 and accompanying text.
140. 5A JACOBS, supra note 7, section 66.02[al [iii] [C], at 3-443.
141. "Mhe liability of a trading of tipping defendant under the misappropriation
theory... turn on two issues: (1) Did the defendant create the information? (2)
Was the information intended as a basis for his trading or tipping?" Id.
142. Id. at section 66.02[a] [iii] [B], at 3-430.
143. "[Dirks] should not profit from the information [he] obtained from Se-
crist." 103 S. Ct. at 3273 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144. "Nor did Dirks misappropriate... the information about Equity Funding."
Id. at 3267.
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Secrist merely learned of the information from others while at
Equity Funding and passed it on. Whether or not Secrist in-
tended Dirks to further tip or trade is therefore irrelevant. "Per-
mission to trade or to tip must derive from the source of the
information. A tipper's permission alone will not allow a tippee to
trade or to tip others."1 45 Dirks used the information for his own
benefit (commissions and enhanced reputation) by tipping to cli-
ents who traded without disclosure. In sum, Dirks received infor-
mation created by another, the information was not intended as a
basis for trading or tipping,146 and he used the information for his
own benefit. As a result, Dirks violated Rule lOb-5 under the mis-
appropriation theory.
D. Post-Dirks Fallout: The "Constructive Insider"
Since the announcement of the Dirks decision, considerable at-
tention has been paid to footnote 14 of the majority opinion. The
footnote reads in pertinent part:
Under certain circumstances... outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is ... that
they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely
for corporate purposes. [citations]. When such a person breaches his fidu-
ciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tip-
pee. [citation]. For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation
must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information con-
fidential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty. 14 7
The rule the Court stated concerning these "outsiders" has
come to be known as the doctrine of the "constructive insider."
This doctrine has been heralded as a new method for the SEC to
police insider trading.l48 The SEC has even gone so far as to
claim the Dirks decision was "an enormous victory" because of
footnote 14.149
However, the concept of the "constructive insider" may not be
145. 5A JACOBS, supra note 7, section 66.02[a] [iii] [C], at 3-446 to -447.
146. The source of Secrist's information was with those who created and con-
ducted the Equity Funding fraud, not with Secrist. There is no evidence (and it is
also unlikely that) those who perpetrated the fraud intended their shareholders'
trade based upon the information.
147. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983).
148. 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1562, No. 38, at 1820-22; No. 40, at
1912, No. 44, at 2070.
149. Id. No. 49, at 2261 (remarks of SEC Enforcement Director John Fedders in
the December 16, 1983 issue).
as new as some authorities believe. Actually, the concept is
rooted in the SEC administrative proceeding of Cady:
[Officers, directors, and controlling shareholders] do not exhaust the
classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation [to dis-
close].... In considering these elements under the broad language of the
anti-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions
and rigid classifications. Thus our task here is to identify those persons
who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal
affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. In-
timacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited.150
By comparing the quotation from Cady with that from Dirks, it is
clear the underlying concept is the same. Only the manner of ex-
pression is different. One commentator had previously termed
these persons as "access insiders."151
Consequently, the footnote 14 "constructive insider" is not de-
serving of the attention it has received. The Court merely stated
a preexisting rule; only the name is new. The concept adds noth-
ing to the SEC arsenal not already present. The footnote, how-
ever, although not "an enormous victory," was an awakening. The
doctrine had been in disuse for well over a decade.152 Only with
the Dirks decision has the SEC realized the importance and use-
fulness of the doctrine. For example, the constructive insider doc-
trine, if applicable, could be an alternative theory of liability
where the SEC is unable to demonstrate an insider's breach. In
sum, although the doctrine is anything but new, it can be ex-
pected to be utilized frequently by the SEC in the future. In fact,
the SEC has already argued the concept to victory.153
E. Impact
The impact of Dirks will be far-reaching and varied. First, the
Court's motivational requirement effectively eliminated from Rule
150. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
151. 5A JACOBS, supra note 7, section 66.02[a] [iii] [C], at 3-438. See also Brud-
ney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979) (discussing the "outsider" concept).
152. The most recent use the SEC has made of the doctrine seems to be in a
1971 release. Investors Management Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29,
1971) (underwriter and its personnel-including salesmen--are insiders).
153. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Ca. 1983).
Lund was found to have received material nonpublic inside information upon
which he traded without disclosure. The case was taken under submission at the
close of the trial. Prior to a final opinion, the Dirks decision was announced. The
trial court allowed both parties to argue the impact of Dirks. Subsequently, the
court found Lund not liable as a "tippee"; instead, the court utilized footnote 14
from Dirks to find Lund liable as a "temporary insider." See also Securities and
Exch. Comm'n v. Muselia, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (order granting prelimi-
nary injunction from Rule lOb-5 violations and finding a law firm employee a "tem-
porary insider."). But see Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 15 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding the defendants were not constructive insiders).
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lOb-5 the policies of fairness and of investor protection.154 As a
result, the insider trading doctrine has been transformed from a
rule protecting the market to a rule merely policing insiders. In
turn, the incidence of insider trading and tipping may well rise.
Common knowledge indicates the SEC is understaffed in view of
the volume of activities for which it is responsible. Insiders now
have good reason to believe the SEC will be less apt to enforce a
borderline case.
Second, the imposition of the motivational requirement will
greatly enlarge the administrative and judicial burden in Rule
lOb-5 insider trading cases. Previously, an insider was presumed
to have gained by tipping where he knew the "tippee" would
trade on the information.155 With the addition of the new Dirks
requirement, however, the presumption is extinguished. A case-
by-case determination is now required.
In addition, the SEC has an added pleading requirement. Be-
cause the Court made personal motivation an element of Rule
lOb-5, the SEC must always plead motivation. This could quickly
become routine in insider trading cases.156 It is uncertain, how-
ever, whether courts will allow the SEC to simply plead that a
benefit was received by the insider, or whether courts will require
complaints be narrowly drawn, containing specific concrete alle-
gations of the personal gain received. Utilizing a reasonably lib-
eral construction, only the former should be required. If this is
so, the added burden of pleading will be minimal.
The greater problem for the SEC will be its proof requirement.
The majority admitted, "[d]etermining whether an insider per-
sonally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact,
will not always be easy for courts."'157 That most certainly is true.
But if the courts will have difficulty viewing the evidence, then
the SEC's burden of proof will be ever so great indeed. The
problems of proof in some cases may be insurmountable. To com-
bat this proof problem, the Court offered "objective criteria, i.e.,
whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit.
154. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
155. 103 S. Ct. at 3272 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., SEC Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, Securi-
ties and Exch. Comm'n v. Thayer, No. 84-0066 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 5, 1984) ("As part
of this violative conduct, Thayer, for his direct or indirect personal benefit. .. .")
reprinted in Practicing Law Institute, The SEC Speaks in 1984, at 195, 200 (J. Fed-
ders & D. Scharff, Co-chairmen 1984) [hereinafter cited as SEC Speaks].
157. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3266 (1983).
• . ."158 But unless the insider is blatantly obvious in reaping his
reward, the SEC will be hard pressed to demonstrate the benefit
received. Personal benefits-especially indirect benefits-are
quite easily concealed.
Consequently, the SEC can be expected to concentrate on its
stronger cases; its weaker cases will be left unprosecuted. A
crack in the congressional prohibition of insider trading will ap-
pear as the dissent had feared. In those cases where a personal
motivation is not clearly obvious, insider trading by insiders and
"tippees" will proliferate, undaunted by the SEC's enforcement
efforts.
However, the SEC should be able to keep the crack from grow-
ing too wide. For one thing, the SEC can rely on the courts to
broadly construe what is a personal motivation or personal bene-
fit. First, a "personal gain" can mean many things in different fac-
tual contexts. Second, insider trading is both a legal and moral
wrong.' 59 Accordingly, courts will be disinclined to reward those
insider traders who violate the equitable principle of fairness at
the expense of unsuspecting and unprotected investors. Finally,
the other way the SEC can keep insider trading in check is by at-
tacking the insiders and "tippees" on a broader legal base; in ad-
dition to the duty theory, the SEC should utilize the
misappropriation theory and the constructive insider doctrine
wherever possible. The SEC is sure to do so.
The SEC must take the initative. First, it could amend Rule
10b-5 or replace it altogether so as to clarify the specific pro-
scribed conduct. 160 In this manner, the SEC could indicate its re-
sponse to the personal benefit requirement. Second, the SEC
could promulgate a release indicating how an insider or "tippee"
subject to the "disclose or abstain" rule can accomplish an effec-
tive disclosure before trading. Obviously, greater guidance is nec-
essary. However, the Court's "guiding principle"' 61 (i.e., the
motivational requirement) is not only insufficient, but also con-
trary to congressional policies underlying the Exchange Act. The
SEC was appointed the task of upholding those policies. The
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 2070 (remarks of David
Ferber); Written Statement of the Honorable John S. R. Shad, Chairman, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
tions, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee Concerning the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (Apr. 13, 1983), re-
printed in SEC Speaks, supra note 156, at 47.
160. Four months after the decision in Chiarella, the SEC responded by
promulgating Rule 14e-3 under the Exchange Act. S.E.C. Rel. 34-17120. 45 Fed.
Reg. 60,410 (1980). The SEC could do likewise here.
161. 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
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SEC now has an opportunity to act.162
VI. CONCLUSION
In a far-reaching decision, the Supreme Court etched a new and
unprecedented concept into the rules of insider trading. The
Court added a new element to Rule lOb-5 by holding that absent a
personal motivation an insider does not breach his fiduciary duty
to shareholders by trading on inside information. This new rule
violated the spirit of the Exchange Act by undermining its poli-
cies. In addition, the prescript changed the role of the in-
sider/fiduciary-he is now liable under Rule lOb-5 only for
wrongful conduct from which he personally benefits.
The motivational requirement will have an inhibiting effect on
SEC enforcement of laws prohibiting insider trading. Because of
the added weight to its already heavy burden of proof, the under-
staffed SEC can be expected to enforce only those cases where a
personal motivation is clearly obvious. Consequently, an area of
currently prohibited insider trading will arise which will be left
unchecked. Within this gap, instances of insider trading will in-
crease and SEC enforcement actions will decrease. However, the
SEC will be able to stultify the growth of the gap by utilizing
more often the misappropriation theory and the doctrine of con-
structive insider. Even so, those theories also have difficult proof
requirements. The likely result is that investors will receive less
protection and confidence in the securities market will erode.
W. STEVEN SHAYER
162. Congress can also take action to clarify its position as to the purposes and
scope of the Exchange Act and section 10(b). Presently, however, Congress' atti-
tude is to "wait and see" before taking any action. Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 ("[Tlhe Committee directs
the [SEC] to monitor the effects of Dirks for at least two years and report
back. . . ."), reprinted in SEC Speaks, supra note 156, at 899.

